Constitution for a future country / Martin Bailey ; with editing by Nicolaus Tideman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bailey, Martin J.

Contributor:

Tideman, Nicolaus.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Common good--Economic aspects.

Common good.

Public interest--Economic aspects.

Public interest.

Political planning--Economic aspects.

Political planning.

Political participation--Economic aspects.

Political participation.

Physical Description:

x, 310 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave, 2001.

Summary:

This book offers ways to overcome problems that arise when voters, politicians, and bureaucrats pursue selfish interests rather than the general interest in their political behavior. It combines previously published ideas about charging people the costs of their political actions and selling insurance against unfavorable political outcomes, with new ideas about competing legislatures and incentives for generating efficient political outcomes. The book includes new are discussed, as well as a proposed constitution and its rationale.

Contents:

1 The Emerging Country 1

1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Government 2

1.3 The Comparative Efficiency of Governments 3

1.4 The Inefficiency of Government Operations 6

1.5 Interpreting Government Waste 14

1.6 What Can Be Done? 15

1.7 Outline of Chapters to Follow 18

Appendix Are Governments Really Inefficient? 19

2 Ways to Overcome the Public Goods Problem 21

2.2 Constitutional vs. Contractual Redistribution to Destitute Families and Others 28

2.3 Eliciting True Bids by a Second-Price Auction 31

2.4 The Thompson Insurance Mechanism 39

2.5 Representative Legislatures 41

2.6 Delegation of Policy Analysis by the Sovereign People 44

2.7 Competition in the Legislative and Executive Functions 45

2.8 The Judiciary and Competition 47

2.9 A Minimum of Monopoly 49

2.10 Conclusion: Putting it All Together 51

Appendix Notes on Altruism, Ideology, and Anarchy 54

A2.1 Altruism and Public-Spiritedness 54

A2.2 Public Goods 56

A2.3 Altruism, Public Goods, and Willingness to Pay 57

A2.4 The Herd Instinct 58

3 The Draft Constitution and its Rationale 64

Preamble 64

Article I Popular Sovereignty 64

Article II Legislatures, Legislative Programs, and their Execution 65

Article III Powers of the Government and Limitations Thereto 99

Article IV Chief of State and Commander in Chief 108

Article V The Judiciary 110

Article VI Ratification 115

Technical Annex: Procedure for Adjusting Legislative Votes and Voters' Uninsured Harms 120

Appendix The Draft Constitution 122

Preamble 122

Article I Popular Sovereignty 123

Article II Legislatures, Legislative Programs, and their Execution 123

Article III Powers of the Government and Limitations Thereto 138

Article IV Chief of State and Commander in Chief 144

Article V The Judiciary 145

Article VI Ratification 149

Technical Annex: Procedure for Adjusting Legislative Votes and Voters' Uninsured Harms 152

4 Perspectives and Alternatives 155

4.2 Can it Happen? 156

4.3 Is There a Better Way? 158

4.4 Could it Be Subverted? 162

4.5 Is it Overly Specific? 167

4.6 The Payoff in More Concrete Terms 170

4.7 The Perspective of the Voting Family 173

4.8 Some Further Notes on Incentives 177

4.9 Inconsistencies 180

5 The Thompson Insurance Mechanism 182

5.2 Perspectives on Thompson's Insurance Mechanism 183

5.3 Technical Analysis 185

6 Adjustments for Income Effects 189

6.2 The Primary Refund of VCG Taxes for Outcomes in a Continuous Range 192

6.3 Reconciling Budget Balance with Bayesian Incentive Compatibility 194

6.4 The Existence of Equilibrium for Continuous Public Goods 195

6.5 Multiple Discrete Options 196

Appendix Formal Proofs 204

A6.1 Formal Development Of The VCG Mechanism 204

A6.2 The Primary Refund Of VCG Taxes 214

A6.3 Non-Separable Utility In A VCG Economy 230

A6.4 General Equilibrium In A VCG Economy 246

A6.5 Choices Over Multiple Discrete Options 262

7 Why Nash Solutions are Not Solutions 286

7.2 Alternative Mechanisms with Equivalent Results 287.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 297-306) and index.

ISBN:

0333719093

OCLC:

45304341