Risk, ambiguity, and decision / Daniel Ellsberg ; [with an introduction by Isaac Levi].

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ellsberg, Daniel.

Series:

Studies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.)

Studies in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Decision making.

Statistical decision.

Physical Description:

liii, 281 pages ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Garland, 2001.

Summary:

Risk, Ambiguity and Decision, is a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the position originally presented in Ellsberg's much-discussed, ground breaking article, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". In this cogently argued book, Ellsberg mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision, and opens new fruitful lines of investigation whose lessons still have not been fully assimilated.

Contents:

Ambiguity and Risk 1

Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments 6

The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory 17

The Validation of Normative Propositions 22

The Utility Axioms as Norms 26

Normative Theory and Empirical Research 30

The Bernoulli Proposition 37

A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks? 45

Vulgar Evaluations of Risk

The Measurement of Definite Opinions 53

von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities 56

Probability as Price 57

"Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices 65

Appendix to Chapter Three 75

On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence 75

Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise 81

Opinions and Actions: Which Come First? 91

The Logic of Degrees of Belief 93

Opinions that Make Horse Races 97

Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle" 106

Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness" 115

Appendix to Chapter Four 127

The Savage Postulates 127

The Koopman Axioms 129

Uncertainties that are Not Risks 131

The "Three-Color Urn" Example 137

Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity 143

Appendix to Chapter Five 151

Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks? 155

Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance" 158

Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance" 169

The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion" 179

The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion" 190

Boldness and Prudence: The "n-Color Urn" Example 199

Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers 209

Chapter 8

Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms 219

The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization 230

Rubin's Axiom 246

Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle

Winning at Russian Roulette 263.

Notes:

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Harvard University, 1962.

"Further readings on choice under uncertainty, beliefs and the Ellsberg paradox / compiled by Mark J. Machina"--pages xxxix-xlviii.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 271-281).

ISBN:

0815340222

OCLC:

46376890