The relevance of phenomenology to the philosophy of language and mind / Sean D. Kelly.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kelly, Sean D.

Series:

Studies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.)

Studies in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Phenomenology.

Perception (Philosophy).

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

xii, 176 pages ; 23 cm.

Place of Publication:

New York ; London : Garland Pub., 2001.

Contents:

Methodological Introduction: Intentionality as Meaning and Meaningfulness. 1. Intentionality is a common cencern for phenomenology and analytic philosophy. 2. Meaning vs. meaningfulness: two interpretations of intentionality. 3. Searle and the ordinary language accounts of intentionality. 4. Meaningfulness is more basic than meaning. 5. Phenomenology and externalist theories of meaning: Part I. 6. Phenomenology and externalist theories of meaning: Part II

The Phenomenological Approach to Intentionality. 1. Introduction to the transcendental problem of intentionality. 2. The transcendental project: condition-of-the-possibility in Kant and Heidegger. 3. Heidegger's account of the pre-linguistic structures grounding assertion. 4. Heidegger against the representational account of meaning. 5. Merleau-Ponty against the cognitivist account of perception. 6. Summary of anti-representationalist accounts in phenomenology

The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Demonstrative Thought. 1. Evans on perception and demonstratives. 2. Perceptual content and motor intentional behavior. 3. Objective versus egocentric place. 4. Motor intentional identification. 5. A phenomenological account of egocentric space. 6. Against Evans's view of perceptual content. 7. Conclusion: What view of demonstrative content is left?

Phenomology and the Unity of the Proposition. 1. Russell and Frege's formal attempts to solve the problem. 2. The phenomenon of color constancy: empiricist and cognitivist accounts. 3. The empiricist account of perceptual constancy. 4. Criticism of the empiricist account. 5. The cognitivist account of perceptual constancy. 6. Criticism of the cognitivist account. 7. The inadequacy of Peacocke's non-conceptualist alternative

Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of Skillful Action. 1. What is phenomenology and why should a cognitive scientist care? 2. Motor intentional behavior. 3. The phenomenology and cognitive science of motor intentional behavior. 4. Conclusion.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-171) and index.

ISBN:

0815338554

OCLC:

43662005