Liberty worth the name : Locke on free agency / Gideon Yaffe.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Yaffe, Gideon, 1971-

Series:

Princeton monographs in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Locke, John, 1632-1704.

Locke, John.

Free will and determinism.

Physical Description:

xii, 176 pages ; 23 cm.

Place of Publication:

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2000]

Summary:

This is the first comprehensive interpretation of John Locke's solution to one of philosophy's most enduring problems: free will and the nature of human agency. Many assume that Locke defines freedom as merely the dependency of conduct on our wills. And much contemporary philosophical literature on free agency regards freedom as a form of self-expression in action. Here, Gideon Yaffe shows us that Locke conceived free agency not just as the freedom to express oneself, but as including also the freedom to transcend oneself and act in accordance with "the good." For Locke, exercising liberty involves making choices guided by what is good, valuable, and important. Thus, Locke's view is part of a tradition that finds freedom in the imitation of God's agency. Locke's free agent is the ideal agent.

Yaffe also examines Locke's understanding of volition and voluntary action. For Locke, choices always involve self-consciousness. The kind of self-consciousness to which Locke appeals is intertwined with his conception of personal identity. And it is precisely this connection between the will and personal identity that reveals the special sense in which our voluntary actions can be attributed to us and the special sense in which we are active with respect to them. Deftly written and tightly focused, Liberty Worth the Name will find readers far beyond Locke studies and early modern British philosophy, including scholars interested in free will, action theory, and ethics.

Contents:

Chapter 1 A Second Perfection 12

Freedom of Action 13

Freedom of Will: The Negative Views 21

Free Wills 22

Free Volitions 27

The Elusive Something and Freedom of Will: The Positive Views 31

The First Edition 32

The Second and Later Editions 42

Some Consequences of the Second Edition Account 61

Freedom of Will and the Natural Law Theory 65

Chapter 2 Volition and Voluntary Action 75

Action and Active Powers 78

Passion and Proper Action 79

Active and Passive Power 82

Two Degrees of Attributability 85

What Are Volitions? 88

Voluntary Action 99

The Necessity of Causation by Volition for Voluntariness 100

The (Non)Sufficiency of Causation by Volition for Voluntariness 104

An Alternative Interpretation 107

The Power to Act Voluntarily 112

The Special Attributability of Voluntary Action 112

Chapter 3 Free Agency and Personal Identity 118

Choice and Personal Identity 119

Contemplation of (Temporally) Absent Pleasure and Pain 134.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [161]-167) and indexes.

ISBN:

0691049661

0691057060

OCLC:

44174091