Price and nonprice rivalry in oligopoly : the integrated battleground / Robert E. Kuenne.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kuenne, Robert E.

Contributor:

Hazel M. Hussong Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Oligopolies.

Pricing.

Competition.

Physical Description:

xx, 429 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

New York, N.Y. : St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Summary:

Oligopolistic industries are communities of firms which are intensely aware of the high visibility of their price and product quality decisions and their impacts upon rivals' profits. This book adopts a novel approach to oligopolies that permits the combination of competition and cooperation, varying the weights given each in accordance with the structure and ethos of individual industries. It develops the theory of rivalrous consonance as a supplement to or substitute for game theory which seeks to develop a "general theory", incorporating a simultaneous determination of price and quality variables for each firm within the context of multifirm interdependence. It presents methodologies and illustrates them to attain operational frameworks for the application of the theory of integrated competition to real world industries.

Contents:

Part I Some Necessary Preliminaries

1 On Definitions and the Problems of Measurement 3

1 A manifesto 3

2 Some conceptual challenges 8

3 Treating the product 9

4 The measurement and scaling problem 10

5 The case for quasi-measurement or scaling 17

2 Core Characteristics Analysis 21

1 Core characteristics analysis 22

2 Methodologies for quasi-measurement of characteristics: preferences excluded 24

3 Methodologies for quasi-measurement of characteristics: preferences included 30

4 The computation of distances in characteristics dimensions and spaces 33

5 An experiment in characteristics scaling and product distance determination 40

3 Rivalrous Consonance: An Approach to Mature Oligopolistic Competition 50

1 Mature oligopoly 52

2 A simple duopoly model 58

3 Social welfare considerations 62

Part II Decision Making in Oligopoly: Approaches in the Literature

4 Hotelling Models and Other Spatial Analogs 83

1 Spatial analogs 83

2 Hotelling models in a linear product space 84

3 Salop's model with prices variable, locations fixed 88

4 Models with F.O.B. prices fixed, product locations variable: Eaton and Lipsey's model 94

5 Models with F.O.B. prices and locations variable 103

6 Lessons, conjectures, and potential 103

5 Characteristics as Objects of Consumer Preference 105

1 The consumption technology 105

2 A critique of the characteristics approach 116

6 Game-theoretic and Monopolistic Competition Analyses 127

2 Game-theoretic methodology 128

3 Monopolistic competition methodology 138

7 Pure Competition and Monopoly: A Beginning 153

1 Separable pricing of characteristics 153

2 Nonseparable pricing of characteristics 165

3 The welfare implications of simple oligopoly under rivalrous consonance: a comparison 169

Part III Theoretical Guidance to and Usage of Modeling Methodologies

8 The Isolated Firm and Consumer Benchmarking of Measurable Characteristics 177

1 Unwarrantied products with nonaging characteristics 179

2 Warrantied products with nonaging characteristics 189

3 Unwarrantied products with aging characteristics 196

4 Warrantied products with aging characteristics 208

5 Some conclusions and conjectures 218

9 Oligopolistic Competition and Consumer Benchmarking in a Rivalrous Consonance Market Structure: Measurable Characteristics 220

1 Purpose and structure of the model 220

2 The model 221

3 First-order conditions 223

4 Algorithm to solve the model 227

5 Generalization to n firms 260

10 Oligopolistic Competition with Scaling of Characteristics 266

1 Scaling by quality indifference premia 266

2 Model 1: Spatial distances as metric with no tacit collusion 269

3 Model 2: Spatial distances as metric with the rivalrous consonance mode of tacit collusion 287

11 Nodal Changes in Brand Locations in Product Space 298

1 Nodal relocation on a product space without tacit collusion 299

2 Nodal relocation on a product space with tacit collusion 315

3 Nodal relocation with cost structure equalization 320

4 Tacit collusion and entry of new firms 323

12 Selling Costs and Cognitive Distancing 328

1 Model 1

Informational advertising with no tacit collusion, revenue-determined advertising 329

2 Model 2

Informational advertising with no tacit collusion, profit-optimal advertising 343

3 Model 3

Informational and cognitive positioning advertising with no tacit collusion 359

4 Model 4

Informational and cognitive positioning advertising under rivalrous consonance 366

3 Deficiencies in models and modeling methodology 398.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 419-422) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Hazel M. Hussong Fund.

ISBN:

0312215738

0333737326

OCLC:

38832669