Classical indian philosophy of mind : the Nyāya dualist tradition / Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nyaya.

Ātman.

Physical Description:

xx, 309 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Albany, N.Y. : State University of New York Press, [1999]

Summary:

This book examine psycho-physical dualism as developed by the Nyaya school of Indian philosophy, Dualism is important to many world religions which promote personal immortality and to morality which promotes free will. For the Nyaya, the self is a permanent, immaterial substance to which non-physical internal states like cognition belong. This view is challenged by other Indian schools, especially the Buddhist and Carvaka schools.

Chakrabarti brings out the connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the mind-body problem and shows that the Nyaya position is well developed, well articulated, and defensible. He shows that Nyaya dualism differs from Cartesian dualism and is not vulnerable to some traditional objections against the latter. A brief discussion of the Samkhya and the Advaita theories of the self and the critique of these views from the Nyaya standpoint are included, as well as a discussion of a classical Nyaya causal argument for the existence of God. The appendix contains an annotated translation of selected portions of Udayana's masterpiece, Atmatattvaviveka (Discerning the Nature of the Self).

Contents:

Outline of Nyaya ontology 1

outline of Nyaya epistemology 5

the principle of general acceptability of inductive examples (GAIE) 8

brief history 13

work plan 16

2. Understanding Nyaya-Vaisesika Dualism 19

The defining property of being physical 20

Nyaya dualism distinguished from Cartesian dualism 22

the self is neither devoid of extension nor essentially conscious 22

the issue of psycho-physical interaction 25

an empiricistic approach to dualism 27

3. Cognition 31

Classification of cognition 31

fluidity of qualificand-qualifier distinction 32

layered-ness of cognition 32

the objection from an explanatory gap to the thesis of identity of cognitive states with brain states 33

memory 36

doubt 39

erro 40

dream 42

4. Other Internal States 45

Pain and pleasure and why they are different 45

desire 51

aversion 52

the limitation of the exclusively neuro-scientific approach for an understanding of internal states 53

reply to the charge of mysterianism 53

5. The Existence and Permanence of the Self 55

Six signs of the self offered by Gotama 55

the Buddhist no-self theory 57

the argument from memory and how each of the six signs involves memory as shown by Vatsyayana 58

personal identity cannot be grounded in a flowing stream of causally connected states: the arguments of Uddyotakara and Vacaspati Misra 60

the Humean view 66

objection to the Humean view 66

Parfit's view and its refutation 69

the James-Flanagan view and its critique 71

6. The Self as a Substance 79

Vatsyayana's argument for the self as a substance 79

the Buddhist aggregate theory and objections to the category of substance 81

reply to Buddhist objections and additional arguments for substance 82

the two stage argument for the self 86

Vacaspati Misra's reformulation of the argument in the exclusion mood 88

Uddyotakara's argument in the exclusion mood 89

7. The Self and the External Sense Organs 93

Arguments of Gotama and Vatsyayana to show that the self is not identical with the external sense organs 94

further remarks on the argument from memory 97

the argument from the persistence of consciousness 101

8 The Self and the Inner Sense 103

Grounds for the admission of the inner sense 103

arguments of Gotama and Vatsyayana to show that the self is not identical with the inner sense 106

Uddyotakara's argument from the intentional nature of cognitive states 109

the argument from the capability of self control and its application against the theory that the self (or the mind) is the brain 110

9. The Self and the Body 115

Gotama's and Vatsyayana's argument from the lack of consciousness in a dead body to show that the self is not the body 117

comparison with Kripke's argument for the mental-physical contrast 122

the argument that if consciousness belonged to the body, there would have been many cognizers in the same body 124

the argument that conscious states are not bodily states for the latter are either externally perceptible or imperceptible while conscious states are neither 126

the argument from privacy or privileged access 128

comparison with the arguments of Nagel and Jackson and a rejoinder to Lycan 129

further arguments for the self-body contrast 133

the flaw of uniqueness and why the physicalist explanation of privileged access may be vitiated by it 137

the argument from changeability 138

a materialistic objection from bodily movements and its resolution 141

a moral argument 143

10. Miscellaneous Arguments 147

Uddyotakara's response to several anti-self arguments 147

a summary of various Nyaya arguments for eternality of the self 156

11. A Nyaya Causal Proof of the Existence of God 159

Statement of the Nyaya causal argument 159

the dyad 159

the atomic theory 161

the causal agent 162

justification of the premise that every effect has a causal agent 163

the monotheistic conclusion 165

comparison with the proofs of Aquinas and Descartes 166

an atheistic objection and its resolution 172

12. The Samkhya View and the Nyaya Critique 175

Prakrti and purusa 175

guna 175

the stages of evolution 177

the Samkhya thesis of unconscious cognitive states 178

the Samkhya account of perception 179

the question whether cognitions may be simultaneous 180

arguments for prakrti and purusa 181

the Samkhya as promoting reductive neutralism 182

some objections to the Samkhya view by Gotama and Vatsyayana 184

13. The Advaita View and the Nyaya Critique 191

The identification of the individual self with the universal self 191

the self as consciousness 192

the Advaita view of cognition and illusion 193

non-duality of cognition 194

the doctrine that cognition is self-revealing and the critique from the Nyaya point of view 196

some objections by Jayanta Bhatta and Visvanatha 200

Recapitulation of the main points of Nyaya dualism and its difference from Cartesian dualism and some other philosophical positions 207

summary of the main Nyaya arguments 212

the objection from the violation of law of conservation of energy and its resolution 215

Appendix: An Annotated Translation of Atmatattvaviveka 219

Four views targeted for critique by Udayana 219

a list of Udayana's works 221

prayer to God and the implied view of God 222

the self as foundational 223

the concept of momentariness 225

the concept of a moment 226

the argument for momentariness from the premise that whatever has being is momentary and critique 227

the argument for momentariness from the ascription of the opposed characters of ability (samarthya) and inability (asamarthya) and critique 228

the Buddhist reductio and reply 229

two different senses of being a causal condition 230

the argument for momentariness from difference with respect to differentiation and critique 230

the argument from auxiliary causal conditions as an objection to momentariness 234

the argument from inherent ability (yogyata) and critique 235

the argument from immediate productivity (kurvadrupatva) and critique 237

the Buddhist argument from usage (vyavahara) and critique 243

the argument from auxiliary causal conditions revisited as an argument for permanence 247

the Yogacara argument that cognitive states alone are real, for the object of cognition is identical with cognition 252

Udayana's critique that various reasons to show that the object of cognition is identical with cognition are untenable 253

Udayana's objection that if the object of cognition were identical with cognition, when opposed characters become the objects of the same cognition, the latter must lose its identity and disintegrate into more than one cognitions 254

the Yogacara response and Udayana's rejoinder 256

Udayana's argument that if the same thing, such as a mango, is perceived by both seeing and touching, that must be a substance different from its qualia and not the same as any one of its qualia or their aggregate 260

Udayana's objection to an argument to prove the non-existence of the self on the ground of non-apprehension 268

Udayana's argument for the self based on the claim that I-consciousness is incorrigible 269

the argument that the self cannot be the body, for the latter can be conceived to be different from the former 272

the argument that the self is different from cognition, for the latter is an act of which the former is an agent 273

the argument that the self is not reducible to a flowing stream of cognitions, for that makes memory and recognition inexplicable 274.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 293-303) and index.

ISBN:

0791441717

0791441725

OCLC:

40113453