Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy / Francesco Lippi.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lippi, Francesco, 1968-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Banks and banking, Central--European Union countries.

Banks and banking, Central.

European Union countries.

Monetary policy--European Union countries.

Monetary policy.

Physical Description:

viii, 162 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, Ma. : Edward Elgar, 1999.

Contents:

1. Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility: Motivation and Overview 1

Part 1 Extensions of the Credibility Model

2. Credibility and Imperfect Monetary Control 23

3. Rules versus Discretion with Two Policy Instruments 41

4. Distributional Motives and the Inflationary Bias 63

5. Policy Delegation and Elections 73

Part 2 Central Bank Independence and Targets

6. On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets 87

7. Central Bank Independence and Conservatism 105

Part 3 Some Evidence

8. Policy Targets, Economic Performance and Central Bank Independence 121.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 149-156) and index.

ISBN:

1858989159

OCLC:

39732976