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Who is rational? : studies of individual differences in reasoning / Keith E. Stanovich.

LIBRA BF442 .S73 1999
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Stanovich, Keith E., 1950-
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Reasoning (Psychology).
Individual differences.
Physical Description:
xvi, 296 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
Place of Publication:
Mahwah, N.J. : L. Erlbaum Associates, 1999.
Summary:
This volume reviews a body of research on individual differences in thinking and reasoning and brings his conclusions to bear on the longstanding debate over whether people "are" or "are not" rational thinkers. For cognitive scientists and educators.
Contents:
Chapter 1 Conceptualizing Rationality: Some Preliminaries 1
Descriptive, Normative, and Prescriptive Models 3
Pretheoretical Positions on Human Rationality 4
Rationality and Levels of Analysis in Cognitive Science 9
A Framework for the Intentional Level 12
Philosophical Problems at the Intentional Level: Is Human Irrationality Possible? 17
Rationality and Evolution 22
Rationality and Reflective Equilibrium 24
Alternative Explanations for the Normative/Descriptive Gap 28
The Rest of This Book 30
Chapter 2 Performance Errors and Computational Limitations 32
Individual Differences and Performance Errors 32
Individual Differences and Computational Limitations 37
Conclusions Regarding Performance Errors and Computational Limitations 48
Chapter 3 The Inappropriate Norm Argument 53
From the Descriptive to the Normative in Reasoning Experiments 56
Putting Descriptive Facts to Work: The Understanding/Acceptance Principle 61
Applying the Right Norms: Clues From Individual Differences 63
Examples of Normative Applications Undermined by the Understanding/Acceptance Principle 68
Noncausal Base Rates 68
The False-Consensus Effect 74
Explicating Normative Rules and the Understanding/Acceptance Principle 78
The Selection Task: Choosing P(D/[similar]H) 79
The Selection Task: Choosing the Base Rate 81
Noncausal Base Rates: The Disease Problem 83
Examination of Other Problems With Controversial Norms 86
Newcomb's Problem 86
The Prisoner's Dilemma 88
Summary of Applications of the Understanding/Acceptance Principle 92
The Argument Evaluation Results and Reflective Equilibrium 95
Chapter 4 The Problem of Rational Task Construal 98
The Necessity for Principles of Rational Construal 99
Alternative Construals and Problem Framing 103
Evaluating Principles of Rational Construal: The Understanding/Acceptance Principle Again 105
The Disease Problem 107
The Laundry Problem 108
Honoring Sunk Costs 109
Summary of Framing and Sunk Cost Results 115
The Overconfidence Effect in Knowledge Calibration 116
The Conjunction Fallacy 121
The Linda Problem 121
The Job Problem: An Easier Scenario 124
The Student Problem: Frequency Estimation 125
Alternative Construals of Conjunction Problems: A Summary 127
Alternative Construals of the Selection Task 128
Models of Selection Task Performance 133
Chapter 5 Dual-Process Theories and Evolutionary Adaptation Versus Normative Rationality 142
Interactional Intelligence 143
A Generic Dual-Process Framework 144
Alternative Task Construals: Evolutionary Adaptation Versus Normative Rationality 148
Chapter 6 Thinking Dispositions and Decontextualized Reasoning 153
Beyond Computational Limitations: Systematic Associations Among Reasoning Tasks 154
Beyond Computational Limitations: Systematic Associations With Thinking Dispositions 156
Distinguishing Cognitive Capacities and Thinking Dispositions 156
Levels of Analysis and Thinking Dispositions 158
Thinking Dispositions: An Empirical Study 159
Reasoning Independently of Prior Belief: Thinking Dispositions as Predictors of Argument Evaluation Ability 162
A New Analytic Strategy for Assessing Argument Evaluation Ability 163
Cognitive Decontextualization 170
A Direct Test of the Domain Generality of a Cognitive Decontextualization Skill 174
Chapter 7 The Fundamental Computational Bias 190
The Pervasiveness of the Fundamental Computational Bias 193
The Fundamental Computational Bias and Evolutionary Adaptation 202
The Real-World Importance of Cognitive Decontextualization 203
Chapter 8 Has Human Irrationality Been Empirically Demonstrated? 208
Performance Errors 209
Computational Limitations 209
Thinking Dispositions and Rational Thought 211
Reversing the Figure and Ground of Competence and Performance 212
Alternative Task Construals: A Pyrrhic Victory for the Panglossians 216
Alternative Task Construals: A Pyrrhic Victory for the Apologists 223
Questionable Task Interpretations 228
Why Normative Rationality Will Not Disappear 231
The Cultural Transmission of Norms and the Malleability of Computational Limitations 234
Education and Normative Rationality 236
Caveats and Clarifications 238
Assumptions Regarding Evolutionary Rationality and System 1 Processes 238
Alternative Interpretations of Relationships With Cognitive Ability 239
The Plausibility of Computational Limitations in Different Types of Tasks 241
Alternative Construal as a Computational Escape Hatch 241
Not All System 1 Overrides Are Efficacious 243
Normative and Evolutionary Rationality and the Rationality, and Rationality[subscript 2] of Evans and Over (1996) 243
Normative Rationality in the Belief Bias Situation: The Knowledge Projection Argument 244
Rationality and Pretheoretical Biases 249.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 253-281) and index.
ISBN:
0805824723
0805824731
OCLC:
39812301

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