Fast tanks and heavy bombers : innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 / David E. Johnson.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950-2022.

Series:

Cornell studies in security affairs

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. Army--Weapons systems--History--20th century.

United States.

United States. Army--Operational readiness.

United States. Army.

Weapons systems.

History.

Physical Description:

xii, 288 pages ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1998.

Summary:

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.

Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 277-283) and index.

ISBN:

0801434580

OCLC:

38602804