Poliorcetic assault in the Peloponnesian War / Scott M. Rusch.

Format:

Book

Manuscript

Microformat

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Rusch, Scott M.

Contributor:

Graham, A. John, advisor.

University of Pennsylvania.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Penn dissertations--Ancient history.

Ancient history--Penn dissertations.

Local Subjects:

Penn dissertations--Ancient history.

Ancient history--Penn dissertations.

Physical Description:

2 volumes (xix, 969 pages) ; 29 cm

Production:

1997.

Summary:

Scholars have long believed the classical Greeks rarely made direct attacks upon hostile fortifications, and seldom took those they did assault. Siege technology was primitive, and assaults usually succeeded only when the defenders were few or surprised, or their fortifications were crude or weak. This situation has been attributed to a fear of heavy losses in assaults, an aristocratic disdain for the technical arts, a traditional dependance upon ravaging and battle in warfare, and an unwillingness or inability on the part of hoplites to perform this difficult type of combat. However, this subject has not been examined at length, and the arguments advanced to date derive from the casual review of a few dozen events. By investigating thoroughly the use of every poliorcetic method, including assault, during the Peloponnesian War, a lengthy and richly attested period of conflict, we can gain a far clearer picture of the nature of the assault technique and its role in Greek warfare.

We discover, in fact, that 101 assault incidents occurred in the Peloponnesian War, of which one-half ended in successes for the attackers. Assaults were as numerous as land battles, and the assault was just as effective as any other poliorcetic technique. Assaults were performed to meet pragmatic tactical and strategic demands. Hoplites climbed ladders and fought on walltops, and the Greeks risked heavy losses in assaults. The risks must not be exaggerated, however, for assailants usually tried to surprise enemy sites, or take advantage of opportune weaknesses in enemy defenses or garrisons. The Greek failure to develop effective siege devices and engineering techniques, or to utilize such methods often, resulted from a combination of material deficiencies and adverse circumstances. No single polis had the wealth or manpower such methods demanded, while the leagues and their hegemones, Athens and Sparta, frequently fielded armies too small to undertake such efforts, and in any event their attention and resources were drawn elsewhere. The experiments in advanced siege warfare they did perform failed, discouraging further attempts.

Notes:

Supervisor: A. John Graham.

Thesis (Ph.D. in Ancient History) -- University of Pennsylvania, 1997.

Includes bibliographical references.

Local Notes:

University Microfilms order no.: 97-27289.

OCLC:

187470825