Theory of moves / Steven J. Brams.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Brams, Steven J.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social sciences--Mathematical models.

Social sciences.

Game theory.

Physical Description:

xii, 248 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Summary:

Steven J. Brams' Theory of moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes major changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, it extends the strategic analysis of conflicts into the more distant future. It elucidates the role that different kinds of power -- moving, order, and threat -- may have on conflict outcomes, and it also shows how misinformation, perhaps caused by misperceptions or deception, affects player choices. Applied to a series of cases drawn from politics, economics, sociology, fiction, and the Bible, the theory provides not only a parsimonious explanation of their outcomes but also shows why they unfolded as they did.

Contents:

2 Why a new dynamic theory? 6

1 Rules of play: the starting point matters 19

1.2 Applying the standard theory 21

1.3 Rules of play of TOM 23

1.4 Rationality rules and backward induction 27

1.5 Interpreting TOM: Samson and Delilah 34

1.6 Feasible and infeasible moves 40

2 The anticipation problem: there may be no resolution 43

2.2 Three different election games 45

2.3 Anticipation games 53

2.4 The pursuit of the Israelites 57

2.5 The anticipation problem in literature 60

3 Magnanimity: it sometimes pays 67

3.2 Self-restraint by a victim in muggings 70

3.3 Different views on the rationality of magnanimity 73

3.4 The Magnanimity Game (MG) 75

3.5 Applications of MG to historical cases 79

3.6 When is sacrifice rational? 83

4 Moving power: breaking the cycle 85

4.2 Cyclic games and rule 5' 88

4.3 Moving power 94

4.4 The Revelation Game 102

4.5 Bombing campaigns in Vietnam 110

4.6 The effects of reputation 117

5 Order and threat power: eliminating indeterminacy and communicating intentions 121

5.2 The interplay of different kinds of power 124

5.3 Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken 127

5.4 The Cuban missile crisis: moving and order power 130

5.5 Threat power 138

5.6 The use of threat power in Poland, 1980-1 148

5.7 Varieties of power 154

6 Information in games: misperception, deception, and omniscience 157

6.2 Was the Civil War a result of incomplete information? 159

6.3 Incomplete information in the Magnanimity Game (MG) 163

6.4 Misperception in the Iran hostage crisis 165

6.5 Deception in the Cuban missile crisis 170

6.6 Information revelation in Hamlet 174

6.7 The paradox of omniscience 178

7 Incomplete information in larger games: a model of negotiations 183

7.2 A negotiation game with a tie-breaker 187

7.3 The tie-breaker removed 190

7.4 Interpretation of the rules 193

7.5 Intransigence versus size: which is more helpful? 195

7.6 Negotiations on world trade 199

7.7 Intransigence in negotiations 204.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 229-240) and index.

ISBN:

0521452260

0521458676

OCLC:

28064570