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Knowledge and the state of nature : an essay in conceptual synthesis / Edward Craig.

LIBRA BD161 .C67 1990
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Craig, Edward, 1942-
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Knowledge, Theory of.
Language and languages--Philosophy.
Language and languages.
Physical Description:
x, 169 pages ; 22 cm
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990.
Summary:
In this illuminating study Craig argues that the standard practice of analyzing the concept of knowledge has radical defects--arbitrary restriction of the subject matter and risky theoretical presuppositions. He proposes a new approach similar to the "state-of-nature" method found in political theory, building the concept up from a hypothesis about its social function and the needs it fulfills. Shedding light on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis, and the debate over skepticism, this compelling work will be of interest to students and scholars of epistemology and the philosophy of language.
Contents:
Nature and motivation of project
Doubts answered
Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State-of-Nature Theory in Political Philosophy
Evolutionary epistemology
Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary
Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format
The prototypical case
Need for third condition
Discussion of the Nozick-Dretske analysis
Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations
Why justified true belief a good approximation
Comparison with Grice
Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point
Application to putative 'knowledge without belief' cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
Being right by accident
All analyses insufficient
Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
Local v. Global Reliabilism
Discussion of McGinn
Externalist and Internalist analyses
The first-person case
Knowing that one knows
Insufficiency of the various analyses
The 'No false lemma' principle
Its rationale
and its effect
Objectivisation
The 'cart before the horse' objection
and the response
Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty
Knowledge and natural laws
Objectivisation and scepticism
Unger's first account
Two explanations of scepticism: the first-person approach, and the absolute perspective
Knowledge and involvement
What makes truth valuable?
Testimony and the transmission of knowledge
Welbourne: believing the speaker
Other locutions: Knowing Fred
Information v. acquaintance
Interacting with Fred
Knowing London
and German
Other locutions: Knowing how to
The Inquirer and the Apprentice
'Knows how to' compared with 'can'
and with 'knows that'
Appendix Unger's Semantic Relativism 162.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
0198242433 :
OCLC:
21373733

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